Communications Security Establishment | Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications

CANADIAN CENTRE FOR CYBER SECURITY

COMMON CRITERIA CERTIFICATION REPORT

RICOH IM C401F/C401SRF/C431/C431F, Version JE-1.00-H

7 August 2025

672-LSS

V1.2

Canada

FOREWORD

This certification report is an UNCLASSIFIED publication, issued under the authority of the Chief, Communications Security Establishment (CSE).

The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its associated certificate, has been evaluated at an approved testing laboratory established under the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (a branch of CSE). This certification report, and its associated certificate, applies only to the identified version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Canadian Common Criteria Program, and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation report are consistent with the evidence adduced.

This report, and its associated certificate, are not an endorsement of the IT product by Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, and no warranty for the IT product by the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, is either expressed or implied.

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OVERVIEW

The Canadian Common Criteria Program provides a third-party evaluation service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT) security products. Evaluations are performed by a commercial Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) under the oversight of the Certification Body, which is managed by the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security.

A CCTL is a commercial facility that has been approved by the Certification Body to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such approval is accreditation to the requirements of ISO/IEC 17025, the General Requirements for the Competence of Testing and Calibration Laboratories.

By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, the Certification Body asserts that the product complies with the security requirements specified in the associated security target. A security target is a requirements specification document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities. The consumer of certified IT products should review the security target, in addition to this certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT product's intended environment, the evaluated security functionality, and the testing and analysis conducted by the CCTL.

The certification report, certificate of product evaluation and security target are posted to the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the International Common Criteria Program).

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

RICOH IM C401F/C401SRF/C431/C431F, Version JE-1.00-H (hereafter referred to as the Target of Evaluation, or TOE), from **Ricoh Company, Ltd** , was the subject of this Common Criteria evaluation. A description of the TOE can be found in Section 1.2. The results of this evaluation demonstrate that the TOE meets the requirements of the conformance claim listed in Section 1.1 for the evaluated security functionality.

Lightship Security is the CCTL that conducted the evaluation. This evaluation was completed on **7 August 2025** and was carried out in accordance with the rules of the Canadian Common Criteria Program.

The scope of the evaluation is defined by the Security Target, which identifies assumptions made during the evaluation, the intended environment for the TOE, and the security functional/assurance requirements. Consumers are advised to verify that their operating environment is consistent with that specified in the security target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations, and recommendations in this Certification Report.

The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, as the Certification Body, declares that this evaluation meets all the conditions of the Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product is listed on the Certified Products list (CPL) for the Canadian Common Criteria Program and the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the International Common Criteria Program).

1 IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET OF EVALUATION

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is identified as follows:

Table 1: TOE Identification

TOE Name and Version	RICOH IM C401F/C401SRF/C431/C431F, Version JE-1.00-H
Developer	Ricoh Company, Ltd

1.1 COMMON CRITERIA CONFORMANCE

The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5.

The TOE claims the following conformance:

Collaborative Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices, v1.0e

1.2 TOE DESCRIPTION

The TOE is a digital multi-function printer, which is an IT device that inputs, stores, and outputs electronic and hardcopy documents.

1.3 TOE ARCHITECTURE

A diagram of the TOE architecture is as follows:



Figure 1: TOE Architecture

2 SECURITY POLICY

The TOE implements and enforces policies pertaining to the following security functionality:

- Security Audit
- Cryptographic Support
- Access Control
- Identification and Authentication
- PSTN Fax-Network Separation
- Trusted Operations
- TOE Access
- Trusted Communications
- Administrative Roles
- Storage Data Encryption

Complete details of the security functional requirements (SFRs) can be found in the Security Target (ST) referenced in section 8.2.

2.1 CRYPTOGRAPHIC FUNCTIONALITY

The following cryptographic implementations are used by the TOE and have been evaluated by the CAVP:

Table 2: Cryptographic Implementations

Cryptographic Implementation	Certificate Number
OpenSSL v1.1.1	A3561
Ricoh Cryptographic Module for IPsec 2, v1.00	A3560
RICOH Platform Validation Library for JX3, v1.0	A6516
libgwguard, v1.0	A3558
Ricoh Cryptographic Library for ima, v1.0	A3559
Libimaevm, v1.0	A3562
GW Linux NVRAM Encryption Library, v1.0	A3555
AES256CBC, v MB8AL1062MH-GE1	A3921
RICOH RSA Module for U-boot, v1.1.0	A5472
RICOH SHA256 Module for U-boot, v1.1.0	A5473
RICOH Cryptographic Library for Linux Kernel, v1.0.0	A5471
RICOH Cryptographic Library 3, v3.0	A3557
NesLib, v6.5 for ST33	A1288
wolfCrypt, v4.7.0i	A3028

3 ASSUMPTIONS AND CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE

Consumers of the TOE should consider assumptions about usage and environmental settings as requirements for the product's installation and its operating environment. This will ensure the proper and secure operation of the TOE.

3.1 USAGE AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS

The following assumptions are made regarding the use and deployment of the TOE:

- Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it stores or processes, is assumed to be provided by the environment.
- The Operational Environment is assumed to protect the TOE from direct, public access to its LAN interface.
- TOE Administrators are trusted to administer the TOE according to site security policies.
- Authorized Users are trained to use the TOE according to site security policies.

3.2 CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE

The following features of the TOE are excluded from the evaluated configuration:

- USB Port. The TOE has a USB Port that is used to directly connect a client computer for printing. This USB port is disabled during initial installation and configuration of the TOE.
- SD Card Slot. The TOE has two SD Card Slots, one for customer engineers and one for users. The SD Card Slot for customer engineer is used by customer engineers to install components; the SD Card Slot for users is used by users to print documents. Both are disabled when the TOE is operational, a cover is placed on the SD Card slot for customer engineer so cards cannot be inserted or removed and the card slot for users is set to disabled during installation.

4 EVALUATED CONFIGURATION

The evaluated configuration for the TOE comprises:

TOE Software/Firmware	JE-1.00-H	
TOE Hardware		
• IM C401F • IM C401SRF • IM C401F		• RICOH IM C431 • RICOH IM C431F • IM C401SRF
Environmental Support	• Syslog Server • LDAP Server • NTP Server	• FTP Server • SMTP Server

4.1 DOCUMENTATION

The following documents are provided to the consumer to assist in the configuration and installation of the TOE:

a) RICOH IM C401F/C401SRF/C431/C431F, version JE-1.00-H Common Criteria Guide, v1.0 (PDF)
b) User Guide IM C401F/C401SRF, D0FQ7073-EN 2024/11 (HTML)
c) Security Reference, D0FQ7074-EN 2024/11 (HTML)

5 EVALUATION ANALYSIS ACTIVITIES

The evaluation analysis activities involved a structured evaluation of the TOE. Documentation and process dealing with Development, Guidance Documents, and Life-Cycle Support were evaluated.

5.1 DEVELOPMENT

The evaluators analyzed the documentation provided by the vendor; they determined that the design completely and accurately describes the TOE security functionality (TSF) interfaces and how the TSF implements the security functional requirements. The evaluators determined that the initialization process is secure, that the security functions are protected against tamper and bypass, and that security domains are maintained.

5.2 GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS

The evaluators examined the TOE preparative user guidance and operational user guidance and determined that it sufficiently and unambiguously describes how to securely transform the TOE into its evaluated configuration and how to use and administer the product. The evaluators examined and tested the preparative and operational guidance and determined that they are complete and sufficiently detailed to result in a secure configuration.

Section 4.1 provides details on the guidance documents.

5.3 LIFE-CYCLE SUPPORT

An analysis of the TOE configuration management system and associated documentation was performed. The evaluators found that the TOE configuration items were clearly marked.

The evaluators examined the delivery documentation and determined that it described all the procedures required to maintain the integrity of the TOE during distribution to the consumer.

6 TESTING ACTIVITIES

Testing consists of the following three steps: assessing developer tests, performing independent tests, and performing a vulnerability analysis.

6.1 ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPER TESTS

The evaluators verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities by examining their test evidence, and reviewing their test results, as documented in the Evaluation Test Report (ETR). The correspondence between the tests identified in the developer's test documentation and the functional specification was complete.

6.2 CONDUCT OF TESTING

The TOE was subjected to a comprehensive suite of formally documented, independent functional and penetration tests. The detailed testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed results are documented in a separate Test Results document.

6.3 INDEPENDENT TESTING

During this evaluation, the evaluator developed independent functional & penetration tests by examining design and guidance documentation.

All testing was planned and documented to a sufficient level of detail to allow repeatability of the testing procedures and results. The following testing activities were performed:

a. PP Assurance Activities: The evaluator performed the assurance activities listed in the claimed PP.

b. Cryptographic Implementation Verification: The evaluator verified that the cryptographic implementations claimed are present in the TOE.

6.3.1 INDEPENDENT TESTING RESULTS

The developer's tests and the independent tests yielded the expected results, providing assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its ST and functional specification.

6.4 VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS

The vulnerability analysis focused on 4 flaw hypotheses.

- Public Vulnerability based (Type 1)
- Technical community sources (Type 2)
- Evaluation team generated (Type 3)
- Tool Generated (Type 4)

The evaluators conducted an independent review of all evaluation evidence, public domain vulnerability databases and technical community sources (Type 1 & 2). Additionally, the evaluators used automated vulnerability scanning tools to discover potential network, platform, and application layer vulnerabilities (Type 4). Based upon this review, the evaluators formulated flaw hypotheses (Type 3), which they used in their vulnerability analysis.

Type 1 & 2 searches were conducted on **11 July 2025** and included the following search terms:

TOE version and models (Section 4)	ARM Cortex-A57 Dual Core	wolfCrypt, v4.7.0i	wolfSSL, v4.7.0i
OpenSSL, v1.1.1	Web Image Monitor	RICOH	Libgwguard, v1.0
Libimaevm, v1.0	Intel Atom x5-E3930	NesLib, v6.5	ST33TPHF2XSPI
MB8AL1062MH-GE1			

Vulnerability searches were conducted using the following sources:

Ricoh Security Vulnerabilities: https://www.ricoh.com/products/security/vulnerabilities https://www.ricoh.com/info/	NIST National Vulnerabilities Database (NVD): https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search
CISA – Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog: https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog	CCCS – Alerts and advisories: https://cyber.gc.ca/en/alerts-advisories
CVE Mitre : https://cve.mitre.org/index.html	WolfSSL: https://www.wolfssl.com/docs/security-vulnerabilities/ https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl/blob/master/ChangeLog.md https://www.wolfssl.com/?s=vulnerability
OpenSSL: https://openssl-library.org/news/vulnerabilities-1.1.1/	

6.4.1 VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS RESULTS

The vulnerability analysis did not uncover any security relevant residual exploitable vulnerabilities in the intended operating environment.

7 RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION

The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its associated certificate, has been evaluated at an approved testing laboratory established under the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security. This certification report, and its associated certificate, apply only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration.

This evaluation has provided the basis for the conformance claim documented in Section 1.1. The overall verdict for this evaluation is **PASS**. These results are supported by evidence in the ETR.

7.1 RECOMMENDATIONS/COMMENTS

It is recommended that all guidance outlined in Section 4.1 be followed to configure the TOE in the evaluated configuration.

The TOE is a high-quality multi-function print, copy, fax, and scanning device with security features consistent with the Protection Profile it claims conformance with. Of note, the evaluator found that RICOH is a highly mature organization operating with integrity regarding Common Criteria: they value the process and the results.

8 SUPPORTING CONTENT

8.1 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Term	Definition
CAVP	Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CCTL	Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
CMVP	Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSE	Communications Security Establishment
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR	Evaluation Technical Report
IT	Information Technology
PP	Protection Profile
SFR	Security Functional Requirement
ST	Security Target
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSF	TOE Security Function

8.2 REFERENCES

Reference
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
RICOH IM C401F/C401SRF/C431/C431F, version JE-1.00-H Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.4, August 7, 2025.
RICOH IM C401F/C401SRF/C431/C431F, version JE-1.00-H Assurance Activity Report, Version 1.4, August 7, 2025.
RICOH IM C401F/C401SRF/C431/C431F, version JE-1.00-H Security Target, Version 1.3, August 7, 2025.